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Job Durations with Worker and Firm Specific Effects: 
MCMC Estimation with Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data
*
 
We study job durations using a multivariate hazard model allowing for worker-specific and 
firm-specific unobserved determinants. The latter are captured by unobserved heterogeneity 
terms or random effects, one at the firm level and another at the worker level. This enables 
us to decompose the variation in job durations into the relative contribution of the worker and 
the firm. We also allow the unobserved terms to be correlated. For the empirical analysis we 
use a Portuguese longitudinal matched employer-employee data set. The model is estimated 
with a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation method. The results imply 
that firm characteristics explain around 30% of the variation in log job durations. In addition, 
we find a positive correlation between unobserved worker and firm characteristics. 
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The basic stylized facts regarding job durations are well established. For example,
the survey by Farber (1999) provides abundant evidence that in OECD countries,
long-term employment relationships are common, most new jobs end early, and the
probability of a job ending declines with tenure. Unobserved heterogeneity in the
probabilities of job exit can largely account for these stylized facts. If workers are
heterogeneous in terms of mobility propensities, then the observed job exit rate
at any point in time depends on the proportions of those types. Higher mobility
workers experience several short spells while lower mobility workers engage in fewer
but longer employment relationships. The fact that most new jobs end early is
explained by a suﬃciently large proportion of high mobility workers. Furthermore,
the fact that the probability of job ending is observed to decline with tenure is
explained by sorting of the workers into diﬀerent tenure groups: longer (shorter)
tenure groups include a larger proportion of lower (higher) mobility workers.
Since job exit is a decision that involves both the worker and the ﬁrm, it is plau-
sible that exit rates are aﬀected simultaneously by characteristics of workers and by
characteristics of ﬁrms. Whereas the relevance of worker heterogeneity in job dura-
tions is well established (see e.g. Farber, 1999, Bellmann et al. 2000, and Del Boca
and Sauer, 2006), the empirical evidence on the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity is
much more limited.1 It is relevant for a number of reasons to know the relative con-
tributions of worker and ﬁrm characteristics as determinants of job durations. First,
notice that inequality in society depends on the variation in the characteristics of
the jobs that employed individuals have. If the variation in job durations is primarily
driven by worker characteristics then the ensuing inequality will be more persistent.
Conversely, if the variation is primarily driven by ﬁrm characteristics then the re-
structuring of the market form in a sector can have large eﬀects on inequality in
society. Secondly, the results of the analysis are of importance for the econometric
analysis of job durations. If unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity is important then the
inclusion of very large numbers of worker characteristics to a job duration model
does not remove the need to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. Thirdly, the results
simply help in improving our understanding of the determinants of job durations
and job mobility. (Below we also discuss the relevance for the study of assortative
job matching.)
In this paper, we estimate multivariate hazard models for job exits (or, equiva-
lently, job durations), allowing for worker-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved de-
terminants. We also allow these unobserved terms to be correlated. Worker-speciﬁc
determinants encompass the propensity of the worker to leave or lose a job, while
1Abowd, Kramarz and Roux (2006) include worker and ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity in a
model for wages and job mobility and conclude that there is a large amount of heterogeneity
among ﬁrms and their tenure proﬁles.
2ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants can reﬂect the ﬁrm’s preference to employ a stable work-
force. Furthermore, considering that the matching process between ﬁrms and work-
ers may follow some assortative pattern, also in terms of characteristics that are
unobservable to the researcher, we allow the unobserved eﬀects of matched ﬁrms
and workers to be correlated. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that allows
for such a ﬂexible and precise modelling in job mobility decisions. Obviously, the
econometric analysis requires observation of multiple job spells per worker and/or
multiple job spells per ﬁrm. A ﬁrm is cross-sectionally and longitudinally connected
to multiple workers, whereas a worker is longitudinally connected to multiple ﬁrms.
We use a matched employer-employee data set in which both workers and ﬁrms
are longitudinally followed. The data are from Portugal and are exhaustive for the
private sector.
In the econometric analysis we treat the unobserved heterogeneity terms as ran-
dom eﬀects, one at the ﬁrm level and another at the worker level. This is in line
with econometric duration analysis with unobserved heterogeneity (see Van den
Berg, 2001). Due to right-censoring, ﬁxed-eﬀect panel data methods are not feasi-
ble. More to the point, we are interested in the relative contributions of workers’
and ﬁrms’ characteristics in the variation of job durations, and the estimation of the
distribution of the random eﬀects enables such a decomposition.
The model structure is such that the unobserved worker and ﬁrm eﬀects are
neither nested nor independent. In fact, the dependence between the worker and ﬁrm
eﬀect in a given job creates a major complication for the analysis. If the correlation
between the worker and ﬁrm random eﬀects is suﬃciently high then this entails
that the random eﬀects of diﬀerent workers at a given ﬁrm are correlated, and also
that the random eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁrms employing a given worker over time are
correlated. As we will show, this is an implication of the required positive semi-
deﬁniteness of the correlation matrix of e.g. the random term of a ﬁrm and the
random terms of two of its workers. A dependence across workers at a given ﬁrm and
across ﬁrms having employed a given worker implies that many observed job spells
of diﬀerent workers and ﬁrms are statistically dependent. Indeed, with a suﬃciently
high mobility and a suﬃciently large observation window, all ﬁrms and all workers
would have jointly dependent random eﬀects. This would make it diﬃcult to apply
standard Likelihood-type estimation methods that are used to estimate duration
models with one-dimensional random eﬀects. First of all, the computational burden
would be insurmountable. Secondly, it is not clear what would be an appropriate
asymptotic distribution to obtain reliable standard error estimates. Because of the
complex pattern relating the two random eﬀects, we estimate the model using a
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach, based on the Gibbs Sampler and
in line with Manda and Meyer (2005).2 In addition, we consider restrictions on the
2Robert and Casella, 1999 provide a survey of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC).
3correlation of the worker and ﬁrm random eﬀects, such that the assumptions of
worker random eﬀects being i.i.d. across workers and ﬁrm random eﬀects being i.i.d.
across ﬁrms are not violated in the observation window. Our paper thus contributes
to the methodological literature by showing how to handle this complex unobserved
heterogeneity structure.3
The estimates of the correlation between the worker-speciﬁc and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
unobserved heterogeneity term are informative on the extent to which speciﬁc types
of ﬁrms match with speciﬁc types of workers. To see this, consider a ﬁrm where the
job durations are typically short. Is this only because of high job exit rates at the
ﬁrm, or is it also because the ﬁrm attracts workers who have high job exit rates
anyway, i.e. who would also have high job exit rates if employed at ﬁrms where job
spells are typically long? The former reﬂects ﬁrm heterogeneity whereas the latter
leads to a positive correlation estimate. Our paper is therefore connected to the
expanding literature on assortative matching of workers and ﬁrms. Recent advances
in this literature focus on assortative matching in terms of (worker-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc) productivity (see Mendes, Van den Berg and Lindeboom, 2007, and Lopes
de Melo, 2008, for empirical analyses based on matched employer-employee data). If
the worker and the ﬁrm each have a high productivity contribution then the surplus
of the match may also be high, and if this is divided amongst them then they may
be relatively satisﬁed with the match, resulting in a low job exit rate. So to the
extent that productivity is reﬂected in job exit rates, we may use the estimate of the
correlation to examine whether the job duration data conﬁrm positive assortative
matching.
The paper is organized in six sections. The Portuguese matched employer-employee
data are described in Section 2. These data have been used before in a number of
studies. See e.g. Vieira, Cardoso and Portela (2005), Cardoso and Portela (2005),
and Mendes, Van den Berg and Lindeboom (2007), for descriptions and analyses of
the data and for summaries of the Portuguese labor market. Section 3 presents the
duration models that we estimate. In Section 4, we discuss the estimation method
and the choice of the prior distributions. The results are discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The study is based on Quadros de Pessoal, a longitudinal matched employer-employee
data set gathered by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Solidarity. The data are
collected through a report that all ﬁrms with registered employees are legally obliged
to provide every year. The reported data concern all workers employed by the ﬁrm in
3See Dostie, 2005 for an analysis with a worker random eﬀect and a job match-speciﬁc random
eﬀect.
4the month in which the survey is collected (March up to 1993, October since 1994).
Coverage is low for the agricultural sector and non-existent for public administration
and domestic services. On the other hand, the manufacturing and private services
sectors are almost fully covered.
An identiﬁcation code is assigned to every ﬁrm when it enters the data set for
the ﬁrst time, while the identiﬁcation code of the worker is a transformation of
his social security number. Based on these identiﬁcation numbers, one can match
workers and ﬁrms, and follow both over time to identify job-to-job transitions. To
avoid initial-condition problems, we reconstruct the data as if they were collected
using ﬂow sampling, by keeping only spells with observed entry. We return to this
issue in Section 4.
Since additional checks on the accuracy of the ﬁrm identiﬁcation code are imple-
mented by the Ministry since 1994, we use the data covering the period 1994-2000.
These data comprise nearly 385 thousand ﬁrms and 4 million workers. For our study
we apply a few conditions on characteristics of workers, ﬁrms and spells: (a) we dis-
card ﬁrms that leave, temporarily or permanently, the market in order to exclude
from our analysis job transitions exclusively caused by the closure of the ﬁrm; (b)
we exclude workers who, at some point, are observed in a non-paid job or in self-
employment; (c) we exclude spells with no observed entry and spells terminated
by a transition which is not job-to-job. This results in a dataset covering around
338 thousand workers and 55 thousand ﬁrms. Descriptives relative to these data are
presented under “Full data” in the Appendix . To reduce the computational burden
of the estimation procedure, we also use a subsample that we extract such that it
has the same worker characteristics as the full data. This involves 6582 ﬁrms and
9222 workers. The data conﬁrm the stylized facts that new jobs end early, and that
the transition rate decreases with tenure.
Due to the way in which the data are collected, we do not have details on the
worker’s labor market events between consecutive surveys, nor do we know precisely
when in between the survey months a job exit took place. We do identify transitions
of workers between ﬁrms occurring in time intervals of one year, and we do observe
the occurrence of other short spells (job, unemployment or non-participation spells)
within that time interval. Table 1 summarizes the number of spells per worker.
Table 1: Number of spells per worker





Most workers experience few transitions: only 1 % experienced 3 job transitions
5in the period 1994-2000. Indeed, we are not investigating temporary but “permanent”
employment, with contracts of at least one year.
In our model of job transitions, we use the following observed characteristics
of the worker: age, gender, and education. We also observe whether the job is a
part-time job or not. Age may capture life-cycle eﬀects. ’Job shopping’ tends to
take place mainly at an early age, while the worker is not aware of his own abilities
or of the characteristics of the labor market (Johnson, 1978). Age is grouped into
the categories: 16 - 25, 26 - 35 and 36 - 55 years old. Workers older than 55 were
discarded in order to avoid considering also transitions to retirement, which are out
of the scope of this analysis. Diﬀerent degrees of attachment to the labor market,
diﬀerences in child care and family responsibilities, among other factors, may result
in gender diﬀerences in terms of job mobility. We also control for education, which is
grouped into three categories: primary school, lower secondary, upper secondary and
higher education. A part-time indicator is also included because ﬁrms facing negative
demand shocks may tend to ﬁrst terminate part-time jobs in order to minimize the
loss of speciﬁc human capital. Regarding ﬁrms, the observed characteristics included
in our analysis are economic sector, location, and an indicator for multiple plants.
The wage is also included in the set of controlled observed characteristics inﬂu-
encing the job mobility process. In search models, the wage is often a ﬁrm charac-
teristic and is accordingly included as an exogenous variable for the job exit rate.
Alternatively, one may think of the wage as being partly determined by job mobility
decisions, and so, because of its endogeneity, it should be kept out of the controls
included in the job exit rate speciﬁcation. Also, inclusion of the wage variable as
an explanatory variable would complicate the interpretation of the worker and ﬁrm
random-eﬀects dependence as an indicator of assortative matching. For these rea-
sons, we estimate the models both with and without the wage in the right hand side.
Descriptives of ﬁrms’ and workers’ characteristics are presented in the Appendix A.
3 Model
3.1 Discrete-time job duration models
Since we only observe job entry and job exit on an annual basis, we specify the job
duration models in discrete time. Speciﬁcally, we use the time-aggregated Mixed
Proportional Hazard (MPH) model for the hazard function or conditional job exit
probability. This is in line with the fact that the underlying processes and transitions
are in continuous time.
In our application, a ﬁrm is cross-sectionally and longitudinally connected to
multiple workers, but a worker is only longitudinally connected to multiple ﬁrms.
There is thus no hierarchy in the sample: although a ﬁrm consists of multiple workers,
6these workers change between ﬁrms when they move to another job. We denote by
i = 1,...,I the ﬁrm index and by j = 1,...,J the worker index. Let the time scale
be divided into intervals ]ak−1,ak] where 0 = a0 < a1 < ... < aK < ∞. The
discrete-time job duration tijk is in {1,...,K} and indicates a transition observed






= p[ak−1 < T ≤ ak|T ≥ ak−1,xij(tij(k−1)),vi,wj], (1)
where xijk(tij(k−1)) are both worker- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc observed explanatory variables
that are potentially time varying, vi is a random eﬀect at the ﬁrm level (more
precisely: the eﬀect of unobserved characteristics of ﬁrm i on the job exit rate of
jobs at ﬁrm i; we also call this the unobserved heterogeneity term or frailty) and wj
a random eﬀect at the worker level. Note that the ﬁrm random eﬀect is invariant
across job spells at the ﬁrm, whereas the worker random eﬀect is invariant across
diﬀerent jobs occupied by the worker. Both are time-invariant. The “random eﬀects”
assumption states that these are independent of the observed explanatory variables.
We estimate a range of model speciﬁcations. The simplest model accounts for
observed heterogeneity only. Next, we introduce a worker random eﬀect. The third
speciﬁcation allows for worker and ﬁrm random eﬀects that are independent of each
other. The most general speciﬁcation allows the two random eﬀects to be correlated
for a matched pair of a worker and a ﬁrm.
Following the complementary log-log link function described in Kalbﬂeisch and
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where β0(k−1) is the baseline hazard over the time interval [ak−1,ak[. With a worker
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7Let us denote by λijk the value of the hazard function (1) at time tijk. The






(1 − λijs). (5)






(1 − λijs). (6)










ijk (1 − λijk)
1−δijk, (7)
where δijk is a transition indicator. Likelihood (7) is equivalent to the one of a model
treating the δijk as Bernoulli draws.
3.2 Dependence between the worker and ﬁrm random eﬀects
The individual hazard function as speciﬁed above is conditional on unobserved
worker and ﬁrm characteristics. We proceed by specifying the distribution of these
unobserved characteristics, or more precisely, the distribution of the eﬀects of these
characteristics on the hazard function.
This includes a speciﬁcation of the dependence between vi and wj. We allow these
to be dependent within a job, i.e. the determinants vi and wj of the job duration of
worker j at ﬁrm i are allowed to be dependent, with correlation ρ. At the same time,
to keep the mutual dependence between and across workers and ﬁrms manageable,
we assume that vi is independent across ﬁrms and wj is independent across workers.
As noted in Section 1, this creates a complication. To explain this, we examine the
possible correlations between the joint set of the random eﬀects. An n×n matrix is a
correlation matrix of n random variables if and only if the following three conditions
are satisﬁed: the matrix is symmetric, its diagonal elements are equal to one, and the
matrix is positive semideﬁnite. The third condition excludes matrices where most
oﬀ-diagonal elements are close to -1. Laurence, Wang and Barone (2008) give an
overview of the results. For example, let n = 3 and let the random variables Y1,Y2
and Y3 have zero mean and unit variance. Then the elements ρij ≡ E(YiYj) of the
correlation matrix satisfy
ρ12 + ρ13 + ρ23 ≥ −
3
2
8Consider one ﬁrm with two workers, so that v1 = Y1,w1 = X2,w2 = X3. Then
ρ23 = 0 and ρ12 = ρ13 = ρ, and we obtain that ρ ≥ −3/4. The condition of positive-
semideﬁniteness also rules out that one random variable is strongly correlated to
other random variables that are uncorrelated with each other. For example, it is not







With three workers, ρ can not exceed (1/3)
√
3. It is clear that as we allow for more
and more workers to have worked at a given ﬁrm and for more and more ﬁrms to
have employed given workers, the range of admissible values of ρ covers smaller and
smaller intervals around zero.4 From this point of view, one should either impose
ρ = 0 from the outset, or drop the assumption that the random eﬀects are indepen-
dent across workers and independent across ﬁrms. In the latter case, current ﬁrms’
unobserved characteristics are potentially related to previous ﬁrms’ unobserved char-
acteristics through the workers’ labor market histories, and so on. As a result, many
observed job spells of diﬀerent workers and ﬁrms can be statistically dependent.
Indeed, with a suﬃciently high mobility and a suﬃciently large observation window,
all ﬁrms and all workers could have jointly dependent random eﬀects. In that case,
the data would provide a single joint observation of a large number of correlated
spells with a potentially large number of correlation parameters for the random ef-
fects. This would make it diﬃcult to apply standard maximum-likelihood estimation
methods that are commonly used to estimate duration models with one-dimensional
i.i.d. random eﬀects. The computational burden would be insurmountable, and it is
not clear how to obtain reliable standard errors. Even with simulation methods one
has to draw from a joint normal distribution with a dimension equal to the sum of
the number of workers and the number of ﬁrms, with a structured variance matrix
of which each element has to satisfy a number of constraints increasing with the
matrix dimension to ensure its positiveness.5
We deal with this by pursuing a pragmatic strategy that is justiﬁed by the small
number of multiple job spells per worker in the data. Virtually all workers have less
than 3 job spells. We can also reduce the number of workers per ﬁrm in the sample
(although this may induce a selection bias, since ﬁrms with low vi will tend to have
more workers with long job spells and thus may have a larger workforce). With a
4With normally distributed random variables, this particularly is easy to see: a ﬁrm j with n




5We performed some numerical investigations based on a model with three correlations; one
common correlation across the worker random eﬀects, one common correlation across the ﬁrm
random eﬀects, and our parameter ρ. This results in values of the correlations that are all very
close to zero. Note that a common correlation for the ﬁxed eﬀects across workers or ﬁrms is probably
not very realistic.
9ﬁnite number of spells per worker and per ﬁrm, we may estimate models with non-
zero ρ without violating the positive-semideﬁniteness of the correlation matrix for
the ﬁrms and workers in the data. If the number of spells per worker and per ﬁrm
is small then the bounds on the value of ρ may not be violated in the observation
window. In other words, the admissible range of ρ may be suﬃciently large in order
to obtain an informative estimate of ρ, that is, an estimate that is not too close to
zero. We also estimate models with ρ = 0, and we can then examine whether the ﬁt
of the model is signiﬁcantly better than in the case of ρ = 0. A precisely formulated
bound on ρ is hard to obtain due to the variation in observed labor market outcomes
across ﬁrms and workers and the indirect relation between numbers of spells and the
random eﬀects. Moreover, such a bound would be sensitive to outliers in the data.
If the estimate of ρ is relatively close to +1 or −1 then this suggests violation of the
assumption that vi is i.i.d. across ﬁrms and wj is i.i.d. across workers. Notice that
the latter has implications for empirical analysis of job durations with worker data
and the empirical analysis of job turnover with ﬁrm data, as these types of analyses
always assume independent outcomes across workers and ﬁrms, respectively.
The above approach can be implemented with Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) estimation methods. First, these methods do not require large sam-
ple theory to obtain standard errors. Secondly, these methods do not require numer-
ical integration over multidimensional random eﬀects. In the next section we discuss
the estimation method in more detail.
In addition to the sample that we drew from the population (see Section 2;
hereafter we call this the "unrestricted sample"), we also draw a subsample with no
more than three job spells drawn per worker, and no more than three workers drawn
for a given ﬁrm (hereafter the "restricted sample"). In other words, the restricted
sample contains up to 3 spells per worker and 3 employees per ﬁrm. It comprises
6577 ﬁrms and 7749 workers. The durations and the number of spells in the full
data and the samples are presented in Appendix B. Due to the small number of job-
to-job transitions observed in the period 1994-2000, the restriction does not modify
statistics of the workers characteristics. However, as our ﬁrm identiﬁer refers to a
company and not to a speciﬁc plant, drawing no more than 3 workers per ﬁrm
reduces the weight of large companies and especially those with multiple plants in
the restricted sample.
When choosing a functional form for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution
it is important not to restrict the sign of the correlation between the two random
eﬀects. Moreover, it is useful to have a family of distributions where the correlation
or covariance of the dependence between the two random eﬀects is a separate pa-
rameter. This is why we adopt normal distributions for these random eﬀects. We
normalize their means to zero, and we denote their variances by σ2




The Bayesian approach augments the assumed model with the prior beliefs on the
parameters. We choose proper but uninformative priors. Manda and Meyer (2005)
specify a baseline hazard with steps, related through a ﬁrst-order autocorrelated pro-
cess, and Grilli (2005) uses a polynomial speciﬁcation. Due to the sampling scheme,
in which durations last less than 6 years, we specify a piecewise constant baseline
hazard with unrelated coeﬃcients over the small number of time intervals.6 The
coeﬃcients are given independent gaussian priors with mean 0 and variance 1000.
The precision of each random eﬀect (i.e. σ
−2
f and σ−2
w ) follows a gamma distribu-
tion, and we base our prior elicitation on descriptive statistics. The rate of transition
per worker is about 3.5% for the 5th quantile of the duration distribution and 0.9%
for the 95th quantile. For 90% of the population, there is at most a fourfold vari-
ation between the odds of two workers. The corresponding conﬁdence interval on
the rate of transition is thus of width 3, which implies σw = 0.5. We set our prior
for the precision σ−2
w to a gamma distribution with expectation 2 and variance 4.
Similarly, the rates of transition per ﬁrm are in a range from 1.3% to 4% for 90% of
the population, implying a gamma prior with expectation 3 and variance 9 for σ
−2
f .
A uniform distribution over [−1,1] is speciﬁed for ρ, which is the least informative
possible prior.
Let us denote by T the vector of durations and by M the number of covariates.
Using f as a generic symbol for a density, the joint density of the data and parameters





































Each worker and each ﬁrm have their own value of wj and vi, respectively. As
we sample jobs that commence by a worker’s inﬂow into a ﬁrm, and we follow
workers over time after that, we eﬀectively assume that this inﬂow is the underlying
population. Consequently, the model assumptions like independence of observed
and unobserved explanatory variables relate to this population. The same applies
to the joint distribution of the random eﬀects. In reality, the inﬂow into jobs is
also determined by the outﬂow from jobs, so the distribution of characteristics in
the inﬂow depends on the distribution in the outﬂow. We abstract from these issues.
6We also estimated models using polynomial speciﬁcation and were led to a 6 degrees polyno-
mial, that is, less parsimonious speciﬁcations than with a piecewise constant baseline hazard.
11Alternatively, we assume that we observe a stationary process. Notice that the model
does not allow for calender time dependence anyway.
The posterior is the ratio of (8) over its integral over the parameter space. Even
with all priors being independent, it does not admit an analytical solution. However,
we can construct a Markov chain with elements following the posterior distribution
and approximate the Bayesian estimator using a Monte Carlo method. Here, the
quantities of interest are approached using Gibbs sampling (Gelfand and Smith,
1990), an MCMC method involving draws from the distributions of a given param-
eter conditional on the other relevant parameters.
We run two MCMC chains for each model. On previous runs, we observed the
Markov chains for the parameters σ
−2
f and σ−2
w to converge more slowly than those
for parameters β and ρ. The starting values for β are thus set at the maximum




w , they are set to 1 for the ﬁrst chain and to 50 for the second one.
We set the starting value of ρ to 0 for both chains. We run 50 000 iterations for
the models with the two frailties. From convergence plots of the sampled values and
Gelman and Rubin (1992) statistics, 20 000 iterations were suﬃcient for the burn
in. The posterior statistics are computed from the post-convergence iterations.
5 Results
5.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
In this section, we focus the results obtained with the restricted sample. Results
obtained with the unrestricted sample are reported in the appendix. In this ﬁnal part
of the section, we present the results of two sensitivity analyses. Including the wage
as an explanatory variables or not basically gives the same estimates for the other
parameters - the estimated coeﬃcients diﬀer, at the maximum, by three hundredth
between the two speciﬁcations. Below we therefore only present the results for the
model with the wage included as an explanatory variable.
For the restricted sample, the estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity distri-
butions are in Table 2. Results for shared parameters are quite similar for the three
model speciﬁcations, meaning that increasing the unobserved heterogeneity com-
plexity by considering a further parameter does not really aﬀect the other results.7
In the three models, the standard deviation of the individual unobserved eﬀects is
estimated to be around 0.3 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In terms of unobserved
heterogeneity at ﬁrm level, the estimates of the standard deviation are 0.6 and 0.7
7A similar remark is found in Horny et al. (2005) on a MPH model in continuous time and
two random eﬀects. In their study, maximum likelihood results are sensitive to a change in the
unobserved heterogeneity structure.
12Table 2: Estimates of the standard deviations of the unobserved heterogeneity dis-
tributions
Type of heterogeneity Parameter Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Correlated frailties
ﬁrm eﬀect σf 0.61 0.48 0.75
worker eﬀect σw 0.29 0.22 0.37
correlation ρ 0.50 0.29 0.58
Independent frailties
ﬁrm eﬀect σf 0.72 0.58 0.88
worker eﬀect σw 0.26 0.20 0.33
Single frailty
worker eﬀect σw 0.29 0.22 0.44
(both signiﬁcant at 5% level) for the model with independent frailties and correlated
frailties, respectively, indicating a large amount of unobserved heterogeneity at the
ﬁrm level. Thus, our results suggest the need to consider unobservable component
on both ﬁrm and worker level in job transitions analyses. Intuitively, job transition
behavior depends on individual unobserved propensity to change jobs and on unob-
served retention policies of the ﬁrms. The ﬁrst characteristic is very dispersed across
workers as is the second one across ﬁrms.
The correlation between the worker and ﬁrm eﬀects is estimated to be positive,
around 0.50 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.8 Thus, our results suggest that the
matching process between ﬁrms and workers is, at least partially, based on char-
acteristics unobserved by the econometrician and it tends to follow an assortative
pattern. Intuitively, ﬁrms with preference for a stable workforce tend hire low mobil-
ity workers and high mobility workers tend to search for ﬁrms with high workforce
turnover. Notice that the estimated value of 0.50 is quite high in the light of the
discussion in Subsection 3.2. The value does provide strong evidence for positive
assortative matching in terms of job exit determinants, but at the same time it sug-
gest that the maintained assumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc (worker-speciﬁc) eﬀects being
independent across ﬁrms (workers) may be violated.
Figure 1 shows the contours and surface of the prior distribution, and Figure 2
the contours and surface of the prior evaluated using the estimates of Table 2. The
ﬁgures show how the data aﬀect our prior beliefs using Bayes’ rule. We use fairly
non-informative priors, allowing unlikely values of the parameters to not necessarily
have a zero posterior probability.9 The updated prior has its mass concentrated on
8The estimates of the standard deviations of the mixing distributions on the unrestricted sample
are in Table 14, in Appendix C. The correlation is positive and signiﬁcant, however, the assumption
of independent vi and independent wj is likely to be violated on the unrestricted sample.
9Recall that the posterior equals the prior times the likelihood. Assigning a zero prior probability
13a smaller support, meaning that information has been extracted from the data and
can be used to enrich priors in further analyses.


































Table 3 depicts the so called “weeding out”, i.e., the change, as elapsed duration
increases, in the distributions of ﬁrm and worker unobserved heterogeneities among
survivors.
5.2 Observed heterogeneity
The posterior means for the β coeﬃcients together with information regarding their
signiﬁcance are reported in Table 4. 10 Negative duration dependence is found to be
signiﬁcant in all models, with the probability of separation declining monotonically
on some parameter values leads a zero posterior probability, even if the likelihood reaches its’
maximum for these values.
10The estimates of the β on the unrestricted sample are in Table 15, in Appendix C. They are
similar to the results on the restricted sample.
14Table 3: Quantiles of the unobserved heterogeneity realizations
Type of heterogeneity Min 25% 50% 75% Max
t=0
ﬁrm eﬀect -3.26 -0.49 0.00 0.49 3.41
worker eﬀect -1.11 -0.17 0.00 0.18 1.11
t=T
ﬁrm eﬀect -3.26 -0.59 -0.12 0.33 2.60
worker eﬀect -1.11 -0.19 -0.02 0.16 1.05
with tenure (i.e., with the elapsed duration). This suggests that the empirically
observed inverse relationship between separation rates and job tenure cannot be
fully explained by pure heterogeneity models.
Regarding the controlled worker characteristics, we ﬁnd that women tend to move
less. This result contradicts the ﬁndings of many previous studies of job mobility. The
main reason could be the fact that the gender diﬀerence in terms of mobility rates
is changing over time. Indeed, Light and Ureta (1992) ﬁnd that women’s turnover
behavior is changing: women belonging to early US birth cohorts appeared to be
more mobile than men but this conclusion is reversed when more recent cohorts are
considered.
The results for age are relative to the omitted category of workers with 36 to
55 years (the oldest age group considered in our study). Thus, they indicate higher
transition probabilities for the younger workers. Notice that, controlling for educa-
tion, age captures labor market experience and thus these estimates contradict the
prediction of no-eﬀect, typical from the pure heterogeneity models. Instead, these
estimates can be interpreted under the light of on-the-job search models or models
of job shopping. The ﬁrst type of models predicts that, since the match quality is
known ex-ante, more experienced workers are less mobile because they had already
time/opportunity to move into high quality matches. Job shopping predicts that
mobility decreases with age, as the worker becomes more aware of his own abilities
and of the characteristics of the labor market.
Job transitions are also inﬂuenced by the education level of the worker. Workers
with upper secondary and university education (the reference category in our esti-
mates) are those moving less. The estimate of part-time job eﬀect conﬁrms one of
the stylized facts of the empirical job duration literature: part-time job status has
a strong positive eﬀect on the probability of job separation.
Looking at the characteristics of the ﬁrms, we ﬁnd some diﬀerences across eco-
nomic sectors and across regions. The North (the reference category) is the region
with the lowest job mobility, while Lisbon and Tagus Valley is at the other extreme.
In fact, Lisbon is the largest city of the country and has the most developed and
dynamic labor market. In terms of sectors, the ﬁnancial sector exhibits the highest
15Table 4: Bayesian estimates of β coeﬃcients
Variable None Worker Random Eﬀect(s)
Independent Correlated
Tenure
2 years -0.59 -0.57 -0.38 -0.46
3 years -0.92 -0.89 -0.61 -0.73
4 years -1.42 -1.39 -1.06 -1.20
5 years and more -2.11 -2.07 -1.70 -1.86
Worker characteristics
Female -0.31 -0.31 -0.35 -0.33
Age:
16 - 25 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.71
26 - 35 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.41
Education:
primary school 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.17
lower secondary 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.23
Part-time 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.67
Wage -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Firm characteristics
Multiple plants 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.32
Region:
Center 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.17
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.43
Alentejo, Algarve and Islands 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.30
Sector:
Construction 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.33
Trade 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.25
Financial 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.55
Constant -2.33 -2.38 -2.87 -2.67
Number of workers 7749 7749 7749 7749
Number of ﬁrms 6577 6577 6577 6577
Note: coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at 5% level.
job turnover rates while manufacture (the omitted sector) has the lowest ones.
5.3 Implications
We decompose the variation of the log job durations to separate the inﬂuences
of three components: the variation due to the ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity, the
variation due to the worker unobserved heterogeneity and the variation due to the
observed explanatory variables. We simulate the variance by drawing the observed
and unobserved heterogeneity from the estimated and observed distributions, input
16them in likelihood (7) and obtain a precise approximation of var(logTijk) with a
suﬃcient number of drawings. Table 5 reports the results of the decomposition. In
Table 5: Decomposition of the total variation of the log durations
Source Random Eﬀect(s)
Independent Correlated
observed variables 65% 52%
ﬁrm unobserved eﬀect 31% 28%
worker unobserved eﬀect 4% 12%
correlation 8%
the model with independent random eﬀects, the observed characteristics of ﬁrms and
workers included in the estimated model explain around two thirds of the variation
of job durations. The remaining variation is mostly explained by the unobserved
heterogeneity at ﬁrm level (28%) and the unobserved heterogeneity at worker level
explains only 12% of the total variation. Allowing for correlation between the ran-
dom eﬀects changes mainly the inﬂuence of observed covariates, which falls to half
of the total variation, and gives closer inﬂuences of the ﬁrm and worker eﬀects.
The correlation between the unobserved worker and ﬁrm eﬀects is estimated to ex-
plain 8% of the variation on job durations. In sum, the results for the model with
the most ﬂexible heterogeneity structure indicate that the unobserved components
explain half of the variation in job durations, and, thus, the ﬁrm and worker ob-
served explanatory variables are clearly insuﬃcient to capture the heterogeneity in
job mobility decisions.
The bayes factor summarizes the evidence provided by the data in favor of one
model, and we use it to compare the diﬀerent models. It is the ratio of the probabil-
ities of the data under the diﬀerent assumed data generating processes (Lancaster,
2004), and we denote by B1/2 the probability of the data under model 1 divided by
the probability of the data under model 2. We consider twice the logarithm of the
bayes factor, as suggested in Kass and Raftery (1995), which is on the same scale as
the deviance and likelihood ratio test statistics. Table 6 displays the bayes factors
corresponding to the ratio of the probabilities under the more complex models over
the immediately simpler one. We conclude that there is a strong evidence in favor
Table 6: Bayes factors
2ln(Bw/no) 2ln(Bi/w) 2ln(Bc/i)
Values 409.40 628.69 139.30
of models allowing for two-sided unobserved heterogeneity, among which the model
with correlated frailties is the preferred one. The model allowing for a matching
based on the unobserved is the most successful at predicting the data.
17The building of the Markov chains is computer intensive and we also estimated
the models with no unobserved heterogeneities and one random eﬀect by maximum
likelihood, using an adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximations of the mix-
ing distribution when necessary. The gain of speed allowed us to use the full data
and results are reported in Appendix D, Table 16. The β estimates are broadly
similar to the Bayesian estimates. The likelihood improves with the inclusion of
both the worker and the ﬁrm eﬀects. Estimates indicate that worker and ﬁrm eﬀects
variances contribute to 15% and 25%, respectively, to total variance, when included
separately.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
We have performed two sensitivity analysis. The ﬁrst one tests the sensitivity of
the results to the restriction on the number of matches allowed in the sample. The
results presented above were obtained from the sample with workers and ﬁrms with
no more than 3 matches. Below we present results obtained from a sample with no
more than 2 spells per worker and 2 no more than employees per ﬁrm.
The second sensitivity analysis aims to address the potential endogeneity of
wages. We include as an explanatory variable the diﬀerence between the starting
wage in the current job and the last wage in the previous job. From a job search
point of view, we would expect that the larger this diﬀerence, the lower the exit rate
out of the current job. In such a framework, the level of the wage in any job can
be endogenous, but the diﬀerence between two jobs is due to the randomness in the
matching process. So, in this estimation, we do not deal with wage changes within
a job spell.
Table 7: Estimates of the standard deviations of the unobserved heterogeneity dis-
tributions - sensitivity analysis
Type of heterogeneity Parameter Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Sensitivity analysis: no. of matches
ﬁrm eﬀect σf 0.47 0.31 0.64
worker eﬀect σw 0.27 0.21 0.36
correlation ρ 0.60 0.30 0.70
Sensitivity analysis: wage endogeneity
ﬁrm eﬀect σf 0.70 0.51 0.88
worker eﬀect σw 0.27 0.21 0.35
correlation ρ 0.40 0.01 0.57
Results reported in table 7 show that the estimate of the standard deviation of
the worker unobserved heterogeneity is insensitive to the number of matches allowed
18Table 8: Bayesian estimates for the model with correlated random eﬀects - sensitivity
analysis
Variable Sensitivity analysis
no. of matches wage endogeneity
Tenure
2 years -0.50 -0.40
3 years -0.79 -0.76
4 years -1.27 -1.30




16 - 25 0.70 0.57
26 - 35 0.37 0.32
Education:
primary school 0.17 0.29
lower secondary 0.22 0.20
Part-time 0.65 0.72
Wage -0.04 ...
Wage diﬀerence ... -0.09
Firm characteristics
Multiple plants 0.33 0.10
Region:
Center 0.16 0.14
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.40 0.39








Number of workers 7006 5280
Number of ﬁrms 6261 4251
Note: coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at 5% level.
19Table 9: Decomposition of total variation of the log durations with correlated random
eﬀects - sensitivity analysis
Source Sensitivity analysis
no. of matches wage endogeneity
observed variables 61% 48%
ﬁrm unobserved eﬀect 21% 34%
worker unobserved eﬀect 12% 12%
correlation 6% 7%
in the sample.11 The estimate of the standard deviation of the ﬁrm eﬀect is instead
sensitive to this dimension. In this sample, it is lower - it decreases from 0.6 to 0.47.
The decrease in the estimate of this parameter was already observed between the
unrestricted and the restricted (up to 3 matches) sample. For what concerns the
correlation between the random eﬀects, it increases from 0.5 to 0.6.
The estimates for β coeﬃcients (reported in table 8, column 2) are similar to
those obtained with the restricted sample. Regarding the decomposition of total
variance of log durations, in this sample (results in 9, column 2), the proportion
of variance associated with ﬁrm unobserved eﬀect decreases and it increases the
proportion associated with observed explanatory variables. The contributions of the
worker eﬀects and the correlation are stable.
The inclusion of wage diﬀerences as explanatory variable does not aﬀect the
estimate of the standard deviation of the worker eﬀect. For all models estimated,
this parameter fell always between 0.25 and 0.30. The estimate of the standard
deviation of the ﬁrm eﬀect is here of 0.70 (0.10 higher than in the core results).12
The correlation between the random eﬀects is estimated to be somewhat lower (0.40).
Table 8, column 3, reports the β estimates. As expected, the estimate for the wage
diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly negative (-0.09), indicating that the larger the diﬀerence
between the current wage and the wage in the previous job, the smaller the exit
probability out of the current job.
The decomposition of total variance of log durations, in this sample (results in
9, column 3), indicates that the proportion of variance associated with the worker
eﬀects and with the correlation are stable. The variance coming from the ﬁrm side
and from the observed characteristics change slightly.
11In this section, we present only estimates for the model with 2 correlated random eﬀects.
Estimates for the other models are available upon request.
12As mentioned before, results for the model without wages were extremely similar to those of
the model with wage level, reported as core results. For this reason, estimates without wages were
not reported.
206 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how modern Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo esti-
mation methods can be fruitfully applied to estimate models of job durations with
both worker-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects. In such models, the various unobserved
worker-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects are not nested. We also examine the perfor-
mance of the approach in case the eﬀects are correlated between worker and ﬁrm.
This expands the set of methods that can be used for the analysis of mobility and
matching.
Our results reject a homogeneous view of the labor market, where ﬁrms adopt
similar workforce management strategies and individuals have similar job change
behavior. Instead, the estimates conﬁrm the importance of the unobserved hetero-
geneity at the individual level, and indicate a large amount of unobserved hetero-
geneity at the ﬁrm level. Indeed, about 30% of the variation in the logarithm of
job durations is due to variation in the eﬀects of unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.
Modelling the unobserved heterogeneity underlying job transitions as coming only
from worker observables and unobservables, as is commonly done, is insuﬃcient.
Results for the model allowing for correlation between the two random eﬀects in-
dicate a strong positive correlation. Thus, empirical evidence suggests that employer-
employee matching tends to follow an assortative pattern in terms of unobservable
characteristics of ﬁrms and workers - workers and ﬁrms with similar outcomes in
terms of job mobility and turnover, respectively, tend to match together. As a topic
for further research, it would be interesting to relate these ﬁndings to economic mod-
els of labor markets with mobility. For example, one may impose or test restrictions
from economic models that relate the amount of job search frictions to the wage and
the job duration; see e.g. Lise, Meghir and Robin (2008) for such models.
In fact, the magnitude of the estimated correlation is such that it suggests vi-
olation of the maintained assumption that worker-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects are
independent across workers and that ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects are indepen-
dent across ﬁrms. From a theoretical point of view it is plausible that at least the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobservables are correlated across ﬁrms, since ﬁrms sometimes com-
pete directly with a small number of other ﬁrms. At the same time, econometric
analyses with microdata usually assume independence. Another interesting topic
for further research would therefore be to estimate the size of such dependencies.
However, it remains to be seen whether is it possible to design parsimonious but
suﬃciently general correlation matrices between the various random eﬀects, such
that the model is still estimable without insurmountable computational problems.
21Appendix
A Descriptives of the explanatory variables
Table 10: Firm characteristics
Variable Full data Samples
Unrestricted Restricted
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Multiple plants 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.29 0.45
Sector:
Mining 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05
Manufacturing 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.49
Electricity, gas, water 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
Construction 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35
Trade, hotels, restaurants 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.46
Transport, communication 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
Finance, insurance 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28
and real estate
Region:
North 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.49
Center 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36
Lisbon, Tagus Valley 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.38 0.49
Alentejo, Algarve 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
Islands 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Number of ﬁrms 55 325 6 582 6577
22Table 11: Worker characteristics
Variable Full data Samples
Unrestricted Restricted
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Female 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48
Age:
16 - 25 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46
26 - 35 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49
36 - 55 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45
Education:
primary school 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47
lower secondary 0.43 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.49
upper secondary 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
and university
Part-time 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Wage 703.80 449.63 699.49 441.88 670.36 419.93
Number of workers 338 445 9222 7749
B Summary statistics of the durations
Table 12: Observed uncensored spells
Job spell Full data Samples
duration Unrestricted Restricted
1 64.0% 68.2% 67.9%
2 19.9% 19.5% 19.8%
3 9.6% 7.9% 8.1%
4 or more 6.4% 4.3% 4.1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Note: durations are in years.
Table 13: Number of spells per worker
Number of Full data Samples
spells Unrestricted Restricted
1 90.6% 90.6% 91.9%
2 8.5% 8.5% 7.5%
3 0.9% 0.9% 0.6%
Total 100% 100% 100%
23C Results based on the unrestricted sample
Table 14: Estimates of the standard deviations of the unobserved heterogeneity
distributions - unrestricted sample
Type of heterogeneity Parameter Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Correlated frailties
ﬁrm eﬀect σf 0.76 0.65 0.89
worker eﬀect σw 0.29 0.22 0.38
correlation ρ 0.51 0.34 0.58
Independent frailties
ﬁrm eﬀect σf 0.87 0.76 0.98
worker eﬀect σw 0.26 0.20 0.33
Single frailty
worker eﬀect σw 0.30 0.22 0.41
24Table 15: Bayesian estimates - unrestricted sample
Variable None Worker Random Eﬀect(s)
Independent Correlated
Tenure
2 years -0.59 -0.57 -0.26 -0.39
3 years -0.95 -0.92 -0.49 -0.67
4 years -1.34 -1.31 -0.79 -1.00
5 years and more -2.11 -2.07 -1.49 -1.73
Worker characteristics
Female -0.28 -0.28 -0.35 -0.32
Age:
16 - 25 0.55 0.56 0.75 0.68
26 - 35 0.31 0.32 0.41 0.36
Education:
primary school 0.26 0.26 0.18 0.21
lower secondary 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.19
Part-time 0.56 0.57 0.66 0.62
Wage -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03
Firm characteristics
Multiple plants 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.27
Region:
Center 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.19
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.41
Alentejo, Algarve and Islands 0.19 0.20 0.31 0.29
Sector:
Construction 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.42
Trade 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.30
Transports 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.33
Financial 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.61
Constant -2.41 -2.47 -3.06 -2.75
Log-likelihood -7695 -7565 -6130 -6645
DIC
Number of workers 9222 9222 9222 9222
Number of ﬁrms 6582 6582 6582 6582
Note: coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at 5% level.
25D Frequentist estimates
Table 16: Frequentist estimates - full data
Variable None Worker Firm
Tenure
2 years -0.54 -0.48 -0.40
3 years -0.76 -0.66 -0.55
4 years -1.06 -0.94 -0.82
5 years or more -1.21 -1.06 -0.91
Worker characteristics
Female -0.24 -0.24 -0.29
Age:
16-25 0.49 0.51 0.59
26-35 0.27 0.28 0.33
Education:
primary school 0.20 0.21 0.04
lower secondary 0.19 0.20 0.06
Part time 0.58 0.60 0.56
Wage -0.02 -0.02 0.04
Firm characteristics
Multiple plants 0.18 0.18 0.25
Region:
Center 0.14 0.15 0.21
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.34 0.36 0.40
Alentejo and Algarve 0.38 0.40 0.40
Islands 0.16 0.17 0.25
Sector:
Construction 0.35 0.37 0.13
Trade 0.30 0.31 0.17
Transports 0.04 0.04 0.26
Financial 0.61 0.65 0.28
Constant -2.32 -2.49 -2.46
Log-likelihood -303881 -303361 -274440
σw - 0.54 -
σf - - 0.76
% total var 15 26
Number of workers 338445 338445 338445
Number of ﬁrms 55325 55325 55325
Note: coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at 1% level.
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